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Temporalité, temporalités : philosophie et sciences sociales

Claude Dubar

Temporalités, revue des sciences sociales et humaines

RESUME:

Le passage de la philosophie du temps aux approches scientifiques des temporalités a résulté de l’épuisement des apories du temps qui, d’Aristote et Saint Augustin à Kant et Husserl, ont jalonné les efforts de philosophes pour produire in abstracto une théorie unifiée du temps. Le constat par Heidegger d’une irréductible pluralité des modes de temporalisation a mis fin à cette aporétique de la temporalité et permis le déploiement d’approches plurielles des temporalités par les sciences socio-historiques. Depuis la thèse de la pluralité des régimes d’historicité par les historiens jusqu’à l’analyse des temporalités sociales par les sociologues, toutes les sciences sociales ont multiplié les distinctions internes au temps et les typologies de temporalités pertinentes. Cela n’exclut pas les réflexions citoyennes sur l’émergence d’un temps démocratique et universel réconciliant le temps paramètre englobant et le temps compagnon vécu.

Temporality, temporalities: Philosophy and the Social sciences

The passage from the philosophy of time to the scientific approach to temporality is the result of the double bind in which, from Aristotle to Saint Augustine, Kant and Husserl, has marked the efforts of philosophers trying to produce in abstracto a unified theory of time. Heidegger’s conclusion concerning the irreducible plurality of the modes of temporality put an end to that uncertainty and allowed many various approaches to temporality to blossom in the socio-historical sciences. From the historians’ theory of the plurality of historical regimes to the sociologists’ analysis of social temporalities, several pertinent distinctions internal to time and typologies of temporalities have been forthcoming. That does not preclude citizens from rethinking the emergence of a democratic and universal time that would reconcile Time as the all-encompassing parameter with Time as the lifetime companion. Read more

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Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences

Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference,

trans. Alan Bass. London: Routledge, pp 278-294

Perhaps something has occurred in the history of the concept of structure that could be called an “event,” if this loaded word did not entail a meaning which it is precisely the function of structural-or structuralist-thought to reduce or to suspect. But let me use the term “event” anyway, employing it with caution and as if in quotation marks. In this sense, this event will have the exterior form of arupture and a redoubling.

It would be easy enough to show that the concept of structure and even the word “structure” itself are as old as the episteme -that is to say, as old as western science and western philosophy-and that their roots thrust deep into the soil of ordinary language, into whose deepest recesses the epistemeplunges to gather them together once more, making them part of itself in a metaphorical displacement. Nevertheless, up until the event which I wish to mark out and define, structure-or rather the structurality of structure-although it has always been involved, has always been neutralized or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center or referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin. The function of this center was not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure-one cannot in fact conceive of an unorganized structure-but above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the freeplay of the structure. No doubt that by orienting and organizing the coherence of the system, the center of a structure permits the freeplay of its elements inside the total form. And even today the notion of a structure lacking any center represents the unthinkable itself. Read more

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Leo Strauss: works

Texts by Strauss

Tocqueville, living two generations after Burke, accepted modern democracy on a Burkian basis, without accepting all the [?] of natural religion. That is the starting point of Tocqueville. Tocqueville was here for a very short time, making some inquiries for the French Government. The result of his observations was these remarkable two volumes I believe that no book comparable in breadth and depth has ever been produced afterwards. I believe in no other case in regard to any other country; that a man after such a short sojourn in a country could give such a comprehensive and profound analysis. Tocqueville had, of course, an excellent teacher, Montesquieu. Those familiar with Montesquieu’s turn of phrase recognize the master immediately in the work of the pupil. I think the next great book of this kind was Lord Bryce’s Modern Democracy. But that is not comparable in depth to Tocqueville’s book though it may be correct in many points where Tocqueville was wrong. But Tocqueville still has the heritage of a great eighteenth century philosophic analysis. Now Tocqueville accepts the verdict of providence. Providence has decided in favor of democracy. He makes an important distinction between the sane and moderate democracy which we find in the United States and the revolutionary extremist democracy which justly aroused the ire of Edmund Burke. In other words, America shows to Europe its own future (…) Read more

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The Closing of the American Mind and other essays

Allan Bloom

Professor Bloom has his own way of doing things. Writing about the higher education in America, he does not observe the forms, manners and ceremonies of what is called (usually by itself) the community of scholars. Yet his credentials are irreproachable. He is the author of an excellent book on Shakespeare’s politics, and has translated Plato’s Republic and Rousseau’s Emile. It will be difficult for nettled colleagues to wave him away, and many will want to do just that, for he is shrewd and mettlesome, as well as learned, and a great observer of what Mencken would call, when he was being mean, “the higher learning.” But Professor Bloom is neither a debunker nor a satirist, and his conception of seriousness carries him far beyond the positions of acedemia.
He is not addressing himself primarily to the professors. They are welcome to listen—and they will listen because they come under heavy fire—but he places himself in a larger community, invoking Socrates, Plato, Machiavelli, Rousseau and Kant more often than he does our contemporaries: “The real community of man, in the midst of all the self -contradictory simulacra of community, is the community of those who seek the truth, of the potential knowers . . . of all men to the extent they desire to know. But in fact, this includes only a few, the true friends, as Plato was to Aristotle at the very moment they were disagreeing about the nature of the good.. . . They were absolutely one soul as they looked at the problem. This, according to Plato, is the only real friendship, the only real common good. It is here that the contact people so desperatelyseek is to be found This is the meaning of the riddle of the improbable philosopher-kings. They have a true community that is exemplary for all the other communities.”
A style of this sort will seem to modern readers marred by classical stiffness—”Truth,” “Knowers,” “the Good,” “Man”—but we can by no means deny that behind our objection to such language is a guilty consciousness of the flimsiness, and not infrequently the trashiness, of our modern talk about “values.”

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Camus: The Stranger

Albert Camus

Part One
I

MOTHER died today. Or, maybe, yesterday; I can’t be sure. The telegram from the Home says: YOUR MOTHER PASSED AWAY. FUNERAL TOMORROW. DEEP SYMPATHY. Which leaves the matter doubtful; it could have been yesterday.
The Home for Aged Persons is at Marengo, some fifty miles from Algiers. With the two o’clock bus I should get there well before nightfall. Then I can spend the night there, keeping the usual vigil beside the body, and be back here by tomorrow evening. I have fixed up with my employer for two days’ leave; obviously, under the circumstances, he couldn’t refuse. Still, I had an idea he looked annoyed, and I said, without thinking: “Sorry, sir, but it’s not my fault, you know.”
Afterwards it struck me I needn’t have said that. I had no reason to excuse myself; it was up to him to express his sympathy and so forth. Probably he will do so the day after tomorrow, when he sees me in black. For the present, it’s almost as if Mother weren’t really dead. The funeral will bring it home to me, put an official seal on it, so to speak… I took the two o’clock bus. It was a blazing hot afternoon. I’d lunched, as usual, at Céleste’s restaurant. Read more

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Nietzsche: The Antichrist

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche

Save for his raucous, rhapsodical autobiography, “Ecce Homo,” “The Antichrist” is the last thing that Nietzsche ever wrote, and so it may be accepted as a statement of some of his most salient ideas in their finalform. Notes for it had been accumulating for years and it was to have constituted the first volume of his long-projected magnum opus, “The Will to Power.” His full plan for this work, as originally drawn up, was as follows:
Vol. I. The Antichrist: an Attempt at a Criticism of Christianity.
Vol. II. The Free Spirit: a Criticism of Philosophy as a Nihilistic
Movement.
Vol. III. The Immoralist: a Criticism of Morality, the Most Fatal Form
of Ignorance.
Vol. IV. Dionysus: the Philosophy of Eternal Recurrence. Read more

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Marx: Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right

From the Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right
by Karl Marx
Deutsch-Französische Jahrbucher, February, 1844
For Germany, the criticism of religion has been essentially completed, and the criticism of religion is the prerequisite of all criticism. The profane existence of error is compromised as soon as its heavenly oratio pro aris et focis [“speech for the altars and hearths”] has been refuted. Man, who has found only the reflection of himself in the fantastic reality of heaven, where he sought a superman, will no longer feel disposed to find the mere appearance of himself, the non-man [“Unmensch”], where he seeks and must seek his true reality. The foundation of irreligious criticism is : Man makes religion, religion does not make man. Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to
himself, or has already lost himself again. But, man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man — state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d’honneur, it enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not acquired any true reality.

The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion. Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is the halo. Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not in order that man shall continue to bear that chain without fantasy or consolation, but so that he shall throw off the chain and pluck the living flower. The criticism of religion disillusions man, so that he will think, act, and fashion his reality like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his senses, so that he will move around himself as his own true Sun. Religion is only the illusory Sun which revolves around man as long as he does not revolve around himself. It is, therefore, the task of history, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this world. It is the immediate task of philosophy, which is in the service of history, to unmask self-estrangement in its unholy forms once the holy form of human self-estrangement has been unmasked. Thus, the criticism of Heaven turns into the criticism of Earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law, and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics…

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